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Abstract
We analyze the problem of eliminating an ineﬃcient regulation,
such as protection, in a dynamic model in which there is incomplete
information and unanimous approval from all parties involved is nec-
essary. Existing ﬁrms have heterogeneous cost, and eﬃciency requres
some of them to shut down when the ineﬃcient regulation is eliminated.
The government can set up a revelation mechanism, giving subsidies
and requiring ﬁrms to exit the market at a given time depending on
the information collected. Under full commitment the optimal policy
prescribes that some ineﬃcient ﬁrms remain active and are subsidized.
The optimal policy takes a simple form, with at most two times at
which the ﬁrm are allowed to exit.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many forms of regulation are ineﬃcient so that substantial gains from dereg-
ulation are possible. However, the removal of the ineﬃciency may require
the consensus of the groups protected by the regulation. Such groups are
often fairly large and heterogeneous, and the relevant information private.
Consider the case of eliminating protection in a given market. The rents
lost by any given producer depend on its production capabilities; while a
marginal producer can choose to exit with little loss, a more productive ﬁrm
will have more at stake. Likewise, if consumers’ valuations of the product
are also private, how can the necessary transfers be ﬁnanced so that no
consumer loses with the change?
We analyze the problem of eliminating an ineﬃcient regulation that keeps
prices artiﬁcially high while obtaining consensus from all agents involved.
The planner designs an optimal mechanism to maximize a weighted sum of
incumbent ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumer surplus. Firms have diﬀerent cost
functions and only the statistical distribution of costs is known to the plan-
ner. Agents are inﬁnitely lived and the planner can choose time paths for
subsidies. Since the elimination of the ineﬃcient regulation is going to de-
crease ﬁrms’ proﬁts, the planner has to make transfers to existing ﬁrms in
order to obtain their consensus. We consider a mechanism with balanced
budget, so that transfers must be ﬁnanced by taxes on consumers. In or-
der to simplify the discussion in the rest of the paper we will assume that
the ineﬃcient regulation to be eliminated is a protectionist tariﬀ, although it
should be clear that the results apply in general to all ineﬃcient regulations.
When each ﬁrm produces a ﬁxed quantity we show that under quite
general conditions the optimal subsidy scheme for the planner is to oﬀer
ﬁrms a lump sum transfer at the time the tariﬀ is eliminated and then to
oﬀer a subsidy per unit of output to all domestic producers remaining active.
The level of the production subsidy is set in such a way that some, but not
2all, ineﬃcient ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with average cost above the international
price) prefer to leave the industry. It is important to note that, although
the planner could choose a full men´ u of pairs exit times-lump sum transfers,
under the optimal policy all exit occurs immediately, as soon as the tariﬀ
is eliminated. This result is analogous to the problem of a durable goods
monopolist who is able to commit to a price policy (see Stokey [14])1.W e
also establish that a larger weight of ﬁrms in the welfare function results in
less residual ineﬃciency: more rather than less deregulation. The intuition
is that in that case the planner is more willing to give information rents to
the ﬁrms exiting the market, and this in turn implies that a larger portion
of ineﬃcient ﬁrms will leave.
Similar results hold when the ﬁrm can vary the quantity produced and
have a more general cost function, provided that the planner cannnot mon-
itor the quantity produced by each ﬁrm. In this case we show that the
mechanism is also quite simple, allowing either for exit only at most two
dates.
The optimal policy with commitment does not totally eliminate protec-
tion and is thus ex post ineﬃcient. Thus, the classic inconsistency problem
pointed out by Kydland and Prescott [8] arises. In fact, the problem has the
same structure as the durable good monopolist problem ﬁrst analyzed by
Coase [2]. If governments have only limited commitment, the optimal time
consistent solution will imply gradual elimination of subsidies over time. As
the length of the commitment period decreases, the speed at which subsidies
are lowered increases, and in the limit all subsidies are eliminated immedi-
ately. These results follow directly from Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson [7].
Notice that, in this context, elimination of the subsidies implies that the
1For that problem, Stokey [14] establishes that the optimal policy is to make all sales
as soon as the good is introduced and zero afterwards. In a way, our result generalizes
this one to the case where consumers choose not only the timing but also the quantity
consumed of a durable good and have diﬀerent utility functions.
3government is unable to discriminate among ﬁrms with diﬀerent productiv-
ity. This implies that a larger amount of lump sum transfers has to be paid,
reducing the gains to consumers.
The problem of removing ineﬃcient regulations, such as trade barriers,
in the presence of political constraints has been analyzed in many papers.
For example, Fernandez and Rodrik [6] consider a model where ineﬃcient
regulations have to be removed by majority voting. They assume that indi-
viduals are uncertain about the gains from regulation and that side transfers
are not possible. In such a framework, they show the presence of a ‘status
quo bias’: reforms that are beneﬁcial ex post to a majority of the popu-
lation are rejected ex ante by individuals who fear to be among the losers
rather than among the winners. More recent work, such as Davidson and
Matusz [3] and Davidson, Matusz and Nelson [4], has focused on what kind
of practical policies can be adopted to promote free trade in the presence
of political constraints. Our discussion is of a more theoretical nature, as
we explore the nature of the optimal mechanism for deregulation under the
constraint of unanimity.
Among the papers that have taken a more theoretical perspective it is
worth mentioning Dewatripont and Roland [5] and Mitchell and Moro [9].
Dewatripoint and Roland consider a model where an eﬃciency-enhancing
structural reform can be introduced in an industry at the cost of increasing
workers’ disutility. Workers are heterogeneous in that they have diﬀerent
degrees of aversion to eﬀort. Side transfers are possible but they have to
be ﬁnanced through distortionary taxation, so that the planner prefers to
keep them as low as possible. The structural reform has to be approved
by an exogenously speciﬁed proportion of workers. For the case of unanim-
ity (which is the one we consider) they show that in a static model either
full reform or partial reform2 can be chosen depending on the value of the
2The reform is partial if some ineﬃcient workers are left in the industry.
4parameters. In a dynamic two-period model, full reform can be sustained
as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium whenever it was sustainable in the static
model. On the other hand, a partial reform cannot be sustained as a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium due to time consistency problems. In this case only
a gradual reform can be sustained: all ineﬃcient workers eventually leave
the industry, but the most ineﬃcient ones leave immediately and the others
leave only in the second period. Our model is diﬀerent because we consider
a continuous time-inﬁnite horizon model with a continuum of types. In this
setting, we show that what Dewatripont and Roland call partial reform is
always optimal: The planner always allows some ineﬃcient ﬁrms to stay in
the industry. Furthermore, the analysis of time consistency is much more
complicated, and no easy prediction is available.
Mitchell and Moro [9] analyze a problem similar to ours, in which an
ineﬃcient regulation has to be removed and the winners have to compensate
the losers. The extent of the loss is unobserved, and the winners set up
a revelation mechanism in which the probability of deregulation and the
compensation oﬀered to the losers depend on the announcement about the
extent of the loss. Their main point is that the optimal mechanism for the
winner will typically not allow for elimination of ineﬃcient regulation with
probability 1 even when it is common knowledge that the losses are inferior
to the gains. The reason is that the information rents that have to be paid
to the losers in order to insure unanimity may be large, and the potential
winners prefer to reduce those rents distorting the deregulation decision.
Thus, the main purpose of their model is to explain why ineﬃcient policies
may persist. In constrast our model is dynamic and it is always possible to
Pareto improve the current situation. Our focus is instead on the nature of
the optimal mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the
basic framework and show that the optimal solution under commitment is
t ol e ts o m ei n e ﬃcient ﬁrms to stay in the industry. Section 3 deals with time
5consistency issues. In section 4 we show that the basic conclusions obtained
in section 2 carry on to the case of more general cost functions provided that
side trading among domestic ﬁrms is allowed. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks. All the proofs are collected in the appendix.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
At date 0 a country is considering whether or not to eliminate protection in
a given industry. A tariﬀ is in place that results in zero imports and a local
price p0 which exceeds the international price pI. There is a continuum of
consumers with reservation values for a single unit of the good vi ∈ [0, ¯ v].
The instantaneous utility of each consumer is v −p if the good is bought at
price p, and 0 otherwise. The distribution of v is stationary and given by a
measure G with a continuous density g on [0,v]. Demand for the good at
each instant can therefore be represented by a downward sloping demand
function D(p)=G(¯ v) − G(p),for p ≤ ¯ v.
On the production side, there is a continuum of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm i
produces a single unit of the good at each instant of time at a cost ci.T h i s
cost can only be avoided by exiting the industry, a decision assumed to be
irreversible. Costs are distributed according to a cdf F with a continuous
density f on the interval [0,p o]. Firms and consumers are risk neutral and







. We make the following regularity assumption.
Assumption 1 The functions g and f satisfy the following properties:
• (v − pI)
g(v)
G(v)−G(v) is increasing in v.
• (c − pI)
f(c)
F(po)−F(c) is increasing in c.
Total surplus is maximized eliminating the tariﬀ and letting the equilibrium
price drop to pI.A l lﬁrms with costs ci >p I would exit the industry, and
6ap e r m a n e n tﬂow of imports D(pI) − F (pI) would be required. Absent
private information, the appropriate transfers from consumers to ﬁrms can
be arranged so that all agents gain from this deregulation. This cannot be
achieved when consumer valuations and ﬁrms’ costs are private information.
We now proceed to characterize the set of Pareto improving allocations
that can be achieved with deregulation under private information. This
can be viewed as a standard mechanism design problem, and the revelation
principle allows us to restrict attention to direct mechanisms.
A mechanism consists of a list of functions {d(t,v),τ(v),T(c),S(c)},
where d(t,v) speciﬁes the probability that a consumer with valuation v
consumes the good at date t; τ (v) is the present value of net transfers from
this type of consumer to the principal; T (c) ∈ [0,∞] speciﬁes the time at
which a ﬁrm with cost c must exit the industry and S (c) corresponds to the
present value of net transfers from the principal to this type of ﬁrm3.
Since we assume full commitment of the principal to the mechanism,
the description of the problem can be simpliﬁed by eliminating the time
subscripts and expressing all relevant units in terms of expected net present








Ac o n s u m e ro ft y p ev announcing e v obtains a utility
e U (v,e v)=D(e v)(v − pI) − τ (e v)
and we deﬁne U (v)=e U (v,v). Similarly, the expected discounted proﬁto f
a producer with cost c announcing e c is
e Π(c, e c)=S (e c) − A(e c)c (1)
3Notice that we are assuming that a ﬁrm produces the goods and delivers them to the
government up to time T(c). All payments are included in the transfer S(c). On the other
hand, a consumer pays the price pI w h e n e v e rs h eb u y st h eg o o d ,a sw e l la st h et a xτ (v).
7with Π(c)=e Π(c,c). We constrain the principal to a balanced budget
from the mechanism. A deﬁcit would require taxing other agents in the










S (c)f (c)dc. (2)
On the revenue side we have the taxes paid by consumers and the value of the
goods delivered by ﬁrms. On the expenditure side we have the transfers paid
to the ﬁrms. The mechanism must be Pareto improving, so that consumers
and ﬁrms must have utilities and proﬁts at least as high as under the status
quo.









subject to budget balance, individual rationality and incentive compatibility4.
In order to discuss the solution, we present here a simpliﬁed version of
the problem. It is shown in the appendix that the solution to the simpliﬁed
problem is also a solution to the general problem. Suppose that the planner
is considering the following simple policy:
• Consumer with type v<v ∗ do not buy the good. Consumers with
type v ≥ v∗ buy the good paying a price v∗ = pI +X,w h e r eX is the
excise tax imposed on the good.
• Firms with a cost c ≤ c∗ remain in the industry and receive a subsidy
c∗ − pI,a l lo t h e rﬁrms leave the industry. A lump sum transfer equal
to
po−c∗
r is given to all ﬁrms.
This policy is ex ante individually rational for ﬁrms and consumers (provided
v∗ ≤ po) and incentive compatible. It is also ex post individually rational for
4A full description of the constrained maximization problem is in the appendix.
8high cost ﬁrms to leave the market and for the low valuation consumers to
abstain from consumption, so that the exit and consumption decisions need



























(F(po) − F(c∗)) (5)
v∗ ≤ po,
where the ﬁrst constraint is the budget constraint (this is the form taken by
(2) under the proposed policy) and the second constraint is the individual
rationality constraint for consumers (a price higher than po would make some
consumers worse oﬀ). The next proposition establishes that the solution to
problem (4) is actually a solution to the more general problem (3).
Proposition 1 Suppose that assumption 1 holds and let (c∗,v∗) be a solu-
tion to problem (4). Then the following is an optimal policy:
1 .A tt i m e0p a yal u m ps u m
po−c∗
r ,t oa l lﬁrms.
2. At each instant t ≥ 0 sell the good at price v∗ and pay a subsidy c∗−pI
to all ﬁrms which do not exit.
Thus, the optimal policy is typically ex post ineﬃcient, since usually c∗ >p I.
An interesting question that may be posed in our model is: How does the
optimal policy changes when α changes? The level of c∗ determines the
amount of ex post ineﬃciency; lower values correspond to more eﬃcient
policies, with c∗ = pI corresponding to full productive eﬃciency. Thus, the
issue is what happens to c∗ as α varies.
For each value c∗ deﬁne V (c∗)a st h el o w e s tv a l u eo fv∗ that satisﬁes
the budget constraint (5). It is clear that welfare maximization requires
9choosing V (c∗) whenever c∗ is chosen. Therefore, the objective function


















The properties of the optimal policy c∗ depend on the properties of W(c∗,α)
with respect to c∗ and α. The following result shows that productive ineﬃ-
ciency decreases as α increases.5
Proposition 2 The optimal value c∗ is non-increasing in α.
The intuition for the result is that an increase in α m a k e si tm o r ed e s i r a b l e
for the social planner to transfer money to the ﬁrms, and higher lump sum
transfers to ﬁrms are associated to more exit and higher eﬃciency. In fact,
consider the extreme case in which the goal is to maximize proﬁts under
IR and IC for consumers (i.e. α →∞ ). In this case the optimal policy is
to set a tax X = po − pI and pay a lump sum subsidy
po−pI
r to the ﬁrms,
and no production subsidy thereafter. This leaves the consumers exactly
indiﬀerent between protection and liberalization. Ineﬃcient ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms
with c>p I, exit the market immediately and are strictly better oﬀ than
under protection, while eﬃcient ﬁrms remain in the market and obtain the
same discounted proﬁt as under protection.
5As pointed out to us by Matt Mitchell, there is still the issue of allocative ineﬃciency
in comparing v
∗ to pI. In comments to our paper, Matt Mitchell writes: ”In the extreme
case where α goes to ∞ and c
∗ approaches pI, productive eﬃciency is achieved at the cost
of maintaining maximum allocative ineﬃciency; v
∗ is at the simple monopoly price for a
monopolist with access to both the domestic ﬁrms and the international price, i.e. has a
marginal cost that is the minimum of the supply curve and pI.”
10In general, under the optimal mechanism described in proposition (1) the
ﬁrms remaining in the industry have the same value of discounted proﬁts
before and after the deregulation, while ﬁrms that exit earn an additional
proﬁto fc−c∗
r , which can be considered an incentive rent. Thus, increas-
ing c∗ decreases the incentive rents that have to be paid to the ﬁrms. The
reduction of incentive payments beneﬁts consumers, so that the optimal
mechanism gives lower incentive payments the higher is the weight on con-
sumers’ welfare. Correspondingly, as the weight of ﬁrms in the social welfare
function increases the planner increases the incentive payment to ﬁrms, thus
decreasing c∗.
3 Time Consistency
Consider the case α = 0 where the planner wishes to maximize consumer
surplus subject to the other constraints. 6The optimal solution calls for
keeping in the industry a number of ﬁrms which are known to be ineﬃcient
(ﬁrms with cost c ∈ (pI,c ∗]). It is obvious that ex post all the participants
would like the planner to change the policy. This in turn destroys the ex
ante incentives for ﬁrms to reveal truthfully their cost. In this section we
discuss what happens when the commitment assumption is removed, so
that the time consistency problem ﬁrst discussed by Kydland and Prescott
[8] appears.
The problem of a planner deciding to remove an ineﬃcient regulation
with unanimous consensus is formally identical to the problem of a durable
good monopolist. To see this, suppose that the government gives a uniform
subsidy
po−pI
r to each ﬁrm in the industry and let the price paid to each ﬁrm
drop to pI. This makes sure that no ﬁrm is worse oﬀ, so that the individual
rationality constraint is satisﬁed. After that, the government sells ‘rights to
6For simplicity we restrict our analysis to this extreme case, though we conjecture
results carry through more generally.
11exit the industry’. A ﬁrm leaving the industry at time t has to pay a price
















The problem of the ﬁrm is now formally identical to the problem of a buyer
of a durable good with valuation θ =
c−pI
r . The higher the cost, the higher
the value that a ﬁrm attaches to an exit permit. A ﬁrm which never leaves
the industry obtains utility
po−c
r ,t h u sm a k i n gs u r et h a ti ti sn o tw o r s eo ﬀ
with respect to protection.
We can now see that the problem of choosing the proﬁt-maximizing price
schedule q(t) under the constraint that each consumer voluntarily chooses
the time of purchase is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the subsidy
to ﬁrms while at the same time making them at least as well oﬀ as under
protection7. Stokey [14] has shown that the solution in this case is to sell
the good as soon as it is introduced.
As previously observed, an important feature of the solution is that some
ineﬃcient ﬁrms survive. The analog in the monopolist problem is that some
consumers who are known to value the good more than the marginal cost
are left unserved. The reason why this happens is standard. By letting
some ineﬃcient ﬁrms stay in the industry the planner is forced to pay more
subsidies in order to compensate for losses, but at the same time it is able
to lessen the incentive compatibility problem. Thus, it is convenient to raise
the cut oﬀ cost c∗ as long as the increase in the amount of loss-compensating
subsidy is smaller than the savings induced by the reduced incentive rents
for ﬁrms with a lower cost.
7In our framework the planner desires to maximize the revenue from the sale of exit
permits only if α =0 . I fα>0 then the planner will not choose the price schedule that
maximizes revenue. However, given the nature of the solution proposed in the previous
section it remains true that the optimal policy with commitment is still to set a constant
p r i c ef o rt h ee x i tp e r m i t .
12When time consistency problems are taken into account, the nature of
the problem changes. Rather than an optimization problem we are now con-
sidering a repeated game between the planner (the monopolist) and ﬁrms
(the consumers). We should therefore investigate what outcomes are sus-
tainable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
Results on the durable goods monopolist literature are of two types.
First, we have ‘folk theorems’ results, establishing that almost everything
can be sustained as the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium (see Stokey
[15] for a continuous time model and Ausubel and Deneckere [1] for a discrete
time model.) Second, we have ‘Coase conjecture’ results, establishing that
when we limit attention to a particular class of equilibria then the outcome
is close to the one predicted by Coase [2], i.e. the monopolist oﬀers the good
immediately at the competitive price. In particular, Stokey [15] proves that
in a continuous time model the Coasian outcome is the only one that can be
supported as a perfect rational expectations equilibrium if some continuity
requirements are imposed on agents’ expectation. For the discrete time
version Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson [7] prove that in all equilibria in which
consumers adopt stationary strategies the price charged by the monopolist
in the ﬁrst period approaches the competitive price as the discount factor
tends to 1.
These results are easily translated in our model. The results in Stokey
[15] imply that in a model where the planner can revise its policy in contin-
uous time any time path of exit can be observed as the outcome of a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. On the other hand, when continuity requirements on
ﬁrms’ expectations are imposed then the only subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome is that all ineﬃcient ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with c>p I) exit immediately
and each ﬁrm is given a subsidy
po−pI
r .
A ‘discrete time’ version is obtained if it is assumed that the planner can
commit to maintain a given policy for a period of length ∆.T h i sw o u l db e
the case, for example, if a change of policy requires approval by the Congress
13a n dt h eC o n g r e s so n l ym e e t sa td i s c r e t ei n t e r v a l s .T h e nw eh a v ee x a c t l yt h e
discrete time model with discount factor δ = e−r∆. For this model, the
results of Ausubel and Deneckere [1] and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson
[7] hold: As ∆ approaches zero there are equilibria where the planner gets
arbitrarily close to the ﬁrst best (commitment) solution, but in all stationary
equilibria the Coasian outcome is approached.
4 General Cost Functions and Optimal Mecha-
nisms with no Arbitrage
In this section we drop the special assumptions on technology imposed in
the previous sections, allowing for more general cost functions. We maintain
however the same assumptions on consumers’ preferences. We show that,
under some regularity assumptions on the technology used by the ﬁrms, it
is still possible to obtain a simple optimal policy, namely one that splits the
set of ﬁrms into two subsets and allows for at most two exit times.
The cost function of a ﬁrm is now given by c(q,s). The parameter
s indicates the ‘eﬃciency level’ of a ﬁr m ,w i t ha nh i g h e rs indicating a
more eﬃcient ﬁrm, so that c(q,s) indicates the cost of producing q for a
ﬁrm of type s. The distribution is f(s) on the support [s,s], and we have
R s
s f(s)ds < +∞. For convenience we will set
R s
s f(s)ds = 1, although the
result holds for any ﬁnite mass of ﬁrms. We denote by π(p,s) the proﬁt
function (i.e. π(p,s)=m a x q pq−c(q,s)) and by q(p,s) the supply function
of a ﬁrm of type s. Consumers’ preferences are the same as before, with
instantaneous utility functions given by v − p and valuations distributed
according to g(v). The regularity assumptions needed to obtain a simple
optimal policy are collected below.
Assumption 2 1. For each p the function π(p,s) is bounded in s. Let
¯ π(p) be the bound such that |π(p,s)| ≤ ¯ π(p) for each s;
142.
∂q(p,s)
∂p > 0 and
∂q(p,s)
∂s > 0 for each (p,s).
3. For each s ∈ [s, ¯ s) and for each p>p 0 the following inequality is
satisﬁed:
q(p, ¯ s)−q(p,s)F (s)−
Z ¯ s
s






Part 1 is satisﬁed whenever limq→∞
∂c(q,s)
∂q = ∞ for each s,av e r yw e a k
assumption. Part 2 is also very weak. It requires that the supply of each ﬁrm
be increasing in price, and that more eﬃcient ﬁrms produce more. Part 3 is
the really binding assumption, and its interpretation is not easy. One way
to interpret it is that the ﬁrms are not ‘too diﬀerent’. In particular, notice
that the assumption is automatically satisﬁed when all ﬁrms are identical
(i.e., q(p,s) is not a function of s), since in that case the left hand side of
the inequality is zero and the right hand side is positive. More in general,
the assumption is satisﬁed when the diﬀerence between the supply of the
most eﬃcient ﬁrm is not much larger than the supply of other ﬁrms. From
the technical point of view, the assumption is required to make sure that
we can limit attention, when looking at individual rationality constraints,
to the constraint relative to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm only8. When part 3 of
assumption 2 is satisﬁed then the behavior of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm is not
too diﬀerent from the behavior of less eﬃcient ﬁrms. This makes sure that
their individual rationality levels (that is, the quantities
π(p0,s)
r )a r en o tt o o
diﬀerent. The implication is that when all incentive constraints hold with
equality and the individual rational constraint is satisﬁed for type ¯ s, then
it will automatically hold for all other types. This allows us to characterize
the solution via the standard relaxed problem considered in the literature.
The appendix contains an example provided to us by Matt Mitchell, that
gives a more intuitive interpretation of this assumption.9
8Remember that in our problem the IR constraints depend on the type s.
9Our proof uses the strict inequality of part 2 of the assumption to rule out the possi-
15When ﬁrms are not restricted to unit production, a planner can possibly
dictate not only whether a ﬁrm has to leave the industry or stay but also
the exact level of production at each instant. A mechanism is therefore
characterized by an array
n
τ (v),D(v), ˜ q(t,s),T(s), e S (s)
o
where τ (v)a n d
D(v) are as in section 2, e q(t,s) denotes the quantity produced at time t by
a ﬁrm announcing type s, T (s)i st h ee x i tt i m ea n de S (s) is the total transfer
to a ﬁrm announcing s.
An important issue not arising in the previous framework is that the
planner has to make sure that the quantity ˜ q(t,s) is actually produced by
the ﬁrm. The reason is that the level of output produced may be used as a
screening device: In order to keep incentives aligned, it may be important
that ﬁrms bear the cost of producing the prescribed output. The problem is
that if ˜ q(t,s) is such that for any two ﬁrms the marginal costs are not equal,
there will be arbitrage opportunities. Unless explicitly prevented from doing
so, ﬁrms will engage in side-trading.
We assume that the planner is unable to monitor the trade between ﬁrms,
that is ﬁrms can trade between each other “behind their back” in order to
fulﬁll their output quotas. This is equivalent to put an extra constraint on
the problem.
If we allow for side trading among ﬁrms, we need to make assumptions
about the organization of the market for this good. Given the structure
of our model, and in particular the maintained hypothesis that there is a
continuum of ﬁrms, it is natural to assume that the market is competitive.
Given supply functions q(p,s) and an exit schedule T, the equilibrium
arbitrage price at a given time t, denoted p(t), is given by the unique solution
bility of prices going above p0, which seems a fairly anomalous feature. The assumption is
not satisﬁe di nt h ec a s eo fc o n s t a n to utput considered in the ﬁrst section or when capacity
constraints bind. It can be conjectured (e.g. by continuity) that the same properties








On the right hand side of (6) we have the total quantity that the ﬁrm have to
produce at time t, which is given by the production quota ˜ q(t,s) mandated
by the government for a ﬁrm of type s integrated over the set of ﬁrms active
at time t (i.e. all ﬁr m sw i t ha ne x i tt i m eT (s) >t ). On the right hand
side we have the total quantity that the ﬁr m sa c t i v ea tt i m et are willing to
produce at a price p(t), the aggregate supply.
U n l e s st h er e c o m m e n d e dp l a no fa c t i o ni ss u c ht h a tq(p(t),s)=˜ q(t,s),
arbitrage will take place. It is easy to see that for any mechanism that leads
to arbitrage, we can construct an analogous mechanism with no arbitrage by
imposing this equality and modifying appropriately the transfers to account
for the cash ﬂows that would have taken place in the original mechanism.
This motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 A no arbitrage mechanism is a mechanism
n
T,˜ q, e S
o
such that
there exists a price function p(t) with the property that q(p(t),s)=˜ q(t,s) at
each time t and for each type s.
In a no-arbitrage mechanism the planner, rather than announcing output
quotas, can equivalently announce a price schedule p(t)a tw h i c hs h ei s
willing to buy the output produced by ﬁrms active at time t.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
as a consequence of report s the planner sets an exit time T(s) and a transfer
S(s)t ot h eﬁrm10. Taking this into consideration, the mechanism gives a




e−rtπ(p(t),s)dt + S(ˆ s)
10Under this interpretation of the mechanism, the transfer S (s) is in addition to the
price paid for delivery of the goods.
17An optimal mechanism maximizes social welfare subject to incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality for all ﬁrms and consumers, as well as
budget balance. The constraints related to consumers are the same as in
the previous section. As for ﬁrms, deﬁne Π(s)=e Π(s,s). Then incentive
compatibility requires Π(s) ≥ e Π(ˆ s,s)f o re a c hp a i r( s, ˆ s), and individual
rationality requires Π(s) ≥
π(po,s)
r .
Looking now at the budget constraint, deﬁne the total quantity produced





The planner is committed to buy all goods produced by domestic ﬁrms at
p(t). The goods can be sold at the international price, so that the planner
has to pay (p(t) − pI)Q(p(t),t)a te a c hi n s t a n tt.






























Before proceeding, we observe that on the consumers’ side the optimal pol-
icy must have the same form as in the previous sections, a consequence
of the fact that we have not changed the assumptions about consumers’
preferences.
Lemma 1 Under the optimal policy, there exists a tax X a n dat y p ev∗ =
pI + X such that all types v ∈ [0,v∗) never buy the good and all types
v ∈ [v∗,¯ v] always buy the good at price pI + X.
18The lemma implies that we can concentrate the analysis on the elements of
the mechanism regarding ﬁrms, i.e. the triplet (p(t),T(s),S(s)). We can
now prove the following result.
Proposition 3 There is a solution to the optimal program with the follow-
ing characteristics:
1. There are at most two exit times, T1 and T2,a n dc u t - o ﬀ types s1 and
s2, such that ﬁrms with s ∈ [s,s 1] exit at T1 and ﬁrms with s ∈ (s1,s 2]
exit at time T2.
2. The price paid to ﬁrms changes at most at time T1 i.e. a price p1 is
adopted between 0 and T1 a n dap r i c ep2 is maintained after T1.
3. There are at most two levels of subsidy, S1 and S2, S1 ≥ S2. Subsidy
S1 is paid to ﬁrms exiting at time T1 and subsidy S2 is paid to ﬁrms
exiting at T2.
The formal proof is in the appendix, but the main intuition can be explained
as follows. Diﬀerently from the previous case, it is not possible to character-
ize the solution by looking at the ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization









i.e. H(p,T,S) is the cost of the subsidies given to ﬁrms under that policy.
Let p∗,T∗,S∗ be piecewise continuous functions that (together with D∗ and
τ∗) solve the optimal control problem, and let H∗ be the cost of the subsidies
given to ﬁrms under the optimal policy. For each integer number n we con-
sider the following transformed optimization problem: Choose the functions
p,T,S in such a way that each function takes at most n distinct values. Let
(pn,Tn,Sn) be the solution to this modiﬁed problem. We show ﬁrst that
19for each  >0i ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd n  such that H(pn ,Tn ,Sn ) − H∗ < 
and each ﬁrm obtains at least as much as under the optimal policy. This
implies that for each   we can ﬁnd a policy involving only a ﬁnite number
of changes in prices, exit times and subsidies and giving at least the same
utility to the ﬁrms and ‘almost’ the same utility to the consumers (i.e. the
consumers have to ﬁnance a subsidy to ﬁrms which is only   higher than the
subsidy they pay under the optimal policy).
We next show that (pn,Tn,Sn)=( p2,T2,S2)f o re a c hn,i . e .t h es o l u t i o n
to the modiﬁed problem is always the same and it involves at most 2 values
for each function. We conclude that H
¡
p2,T2,S2¢




(together with D∗ and τ∗, which we already know
to take at most two values) is a solution of the optimization problem, since
each ﬁrm is at least as well oﬀ as under the optimal program and the cost
to consumers is the same.
An analogous result (the optimal policy function is two-stepped) has
been obtained by Samuelson [12]. Our result is more general. In his case,
the utility function of the informed party is linear in the relevant parameter.
This allows him to write the incentive compatibility condition in a much
simpler way, and to solve explicitly the maximization problem. In our case,
the incentive compatibility condition are more complicated, so that the form
of the optimal policy has to be derived through an indirect argument.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the optimal policies that a planner can pursue
in order to deregulate an industry when there is incomplete information
on the characteristics of the regulated ﬁrms and a political constraint of
unanimity is imposed. We have shown that, under weak assumptions and
provided the planner has commitment power, the optimal policy turns out to
be relatively simple, as it involves only a limited number of changes in prices
20and subsidies. Furthermore, deregulation is not complete, as in general it is
o p t i m a lt oa l l o wt h es u r v i v a lo fs o m ei n e ﬃcient ﬁrms.
Appendix
Example (from Matt Mitchell)
The following example is helpful to get a more intuitive sense of the
importance of the last part of Assumption 2.
Consider the simple parametric case where c(q,s)=q2/2s, so that
q(p,s)=ps. Let f be uniform and begin with pI =0 . Then the inequality
reads:
p¯ s − ps
s − s
¯






















> 0. Since the two sides are equal for s =¯ s and
the derivative of the LHS with respect to s is everywhere greater than the
right, it must hold for all s in the interval.
Now if we reintroduce pI > 0 the inequality becomes








¯ s2 − s2





¯ s2 − s2














The inequality must hold for p0 >p>p I, so this is a joint restriction on p0
and s
¯
. The closer p0 gets to pI, the narrower the range of s must be.
This gives the assumption the following interpretation: the ineﬃciency
is pretty big
¡
p0 high relative to pI
¢
relative to the aymmetric information
(the range of s.)









/r. The participation constraints are:
U (v) ≥ U0 (v) Π(c) ≥ Π0 (c). (7)
The incentive compatibility constraints require that:
˜ U(v,v) ≥ ˜ U
¡
v,v0¢
for all v,v0 in [0, ¯ v]( 8 )
and
˜ Π(c,c) ≥ ˜ Π
¡
c,c0¢





Using standard procedures (e.g. Myerson [10]), the incentive compatibility
constraints can be replaced by the requirement thatD(v)b ea ni n c r e a s i n g
function, A(c) decreasing, U0 (v)=D(v)a n dΠ0 (c)=−A(c)a ta l lp o i n t s
where the functions are diﬀerentiable.
The budget constraint (2) can be written as:
Z v
0
[D(v)(v − pI) − U(v)]g(v)dv ≥
Z p0
0
[Π(c) − A(c)(pI − c)]f (c) dc
(10)
We can deﬁne a common support for the two integrals by setting f(c)=0
on (po,v], so that the budget constraint becomes:
Z v
0
{[D(t)(t − pI) − U(t)]g(t) − [Π(t) − A(t)(pI − t)]f(t)} dt ≥ 0,
where t is used as a dummy of integration not to be confused with time.
Deﬁne the new state variable y(t)a sy(0) = 0 and:
y0(t)=[ D(t)(t − pI) − U(t)]g(t) − [Π(t) − A(t)(pI − t)]f(t)








U(t) ≥ U0 (t) Π(t) ≥ Π0 (t)
U0(t)=D(t) Π0(t)=−A(t)
y0(t)=[ D(t)(t − pI) − U(t)] g(t) − [Π(t) − A(t)(pI − t)] f(t)
1
r
≥ D(t) ≥ 01 ≥ A(t) ≥ 0 y(v) ≥ 0 y(0) = 0.
We will propose a solution to this optimal control problem and then show
that the suﬃcient conditions for optimality are satisﬁed. The proposed
optimal control is




A(t)=1i ft ≤ c∗, A(t)=0i ft>c ∗
where (c∗,v∗) are the solutions to problem (4). Under the optimal control
the state variables turn out to be:











We now show that the proposed solution satisﬁes the suﬃcient conditions
of Theorem 5.1 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (see also their Note 5.11). Deﬁne
the Hamiltonian associated to the problem as
H(U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,t)=U(t)g(t)+αΠ(t)f(t)+λ1(t)D(t)−λ2 (t)A(t)+
λ3(t){[D(t)(t − pI) − U(t)] g(t) − [Π(t) − A(t)(pI − t)] f(t)}.
Since we also have constraints on the state variables, we need to build the
Lagrangian L to incorporate them:
L(U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,µ 1,µ 2,t)=H(U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,t)+
µ1(t)[U(t) − U0 (t)] + µ2(t)[Π(t) − Π0 (t)].
A solution to the optimal control problem can be characterized by the array
{U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,µ 1,µ 2}. The solution we propose is:
23• The state variables U,Π and the control variables A,D are as previ-
ously described (i.e. the solutions to the simpliﬁed problem).
• Let λ∗ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the budget constraint
obtained in the solution of the simpliﬁed problem (4). Then we set
λ3(t)=λ∗ and deﬁne the functions λ1,λ 2 as:
λ1(t)=( 1− λ∗)(G(v) − G(t)) λ2(t)=( α − λ∗)(F(po) − F(t))
• The functions µ1,µ2, are given by µ1(t)=µ2(t)=0 .
We now go through the laundry list of the conditions.
1. For each t,t h ev a l u eo fD(t) maximizes H(U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,t) in
t. This is equivalent to the requirement that the expression λ1(t)+
λ3(t)(t − pI)g(t) be negative for t<v ∗ and positive otherwise. If
we substitute the proposed expression of the lambdas the condition
becomes:
(1 − λ∗)(G(v) − G(t)) + λ∗(t − pI)g(t) > 0i ft>v ∗
(1 − λ∗)(G(v) − G(t)) + λ∗(t − pI)g(t) < 0i ft<v ∗
The expression (1 − λ∗)(G(v) − G(t)) + λ∗(t − pI)g(t)i si d e n t i c a lt o
the derivative with respect to v∗ of the Lagrangian in the simpliﬁed
problem (4). Therefore, it takes value zero at v∗. Furthermore, given
our regularity conditions, the expression is negative for t<v ∗ and
positive if t>v ∗. Therefore, the condition is satisﬁed.
2. For each t,t h ev a l u eo fA(t) maximizes H(U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,t) in
t. Using the same reasoning, the condition becomes
(λ∗ − α)(F(po) − F(t)) − λ∗(t − pI)f(t) > 0i ft<c ∗
(λ∗ − α)(F(po) − F(t)) − λ∗(t − pI)f(t) < 0i ft>c ∗
Again, by deﬁnition of λ∗,c ∗ the expression is zero at c∗. The regularity





∂Π and λ1(v)=λ2(v)=0 . This follows
immediately from the deﬁnitions.
4. λ3 ≥ 0. This follows from the ﬁrst order condition of the simpliﬁed
problem.
5. The function b H(U,Π,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,t)=m a x D,A feasible H(U,Π,D,A,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3,t)
is concave in U and Π. This follows immediately from the linearity of
H.
6. The constraints on the state variables are described by quasi-concave







r are respectively quasi-
concave in U and Π. Again, this follows from linearity.
This completes the requirements, and we can conclude that the proposed
solution is in fact optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that W(c∗,α)s a t i s ﬁes decreasing dif-
ferences in c∗;α. This implies, by Topkis’ theorem (see Topkis [16]), that c∗
is decreasing in α. To show decreasing diﬀerences it is enough to show that
the second mixed derivative is non positive. By direct computation:
∂2W
∂α∂c∗ = F(c∗) − F(po) ≤ 0
We can therefore conclude that c∗ is decreasing in α.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Let {τ∗,D∗,p ∗,T∗,S∗} be an optimal policy. Deﬁne














(D(v)(v − pI) − τ(v))g(v)dv
25s.t.




This program has the same structure as the one solved in section 2, and we
can therefore conclude that the optimal way of ﬁnancing a given transfer to
ﬁr m si ss i m p l yt os e tac o n s t a n te x c i s et a xX and let consumers buy the
good at pI + X.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Let H(p∗,T∗,S∗)a n dH(pn,Tn,Sn)b ed e ﬁned
as in the discussion after the theorem, and Π(s)a st h et o t a lp r o ﬁt obtained
by a ﬁrm of type s under the optimal program. We ﬁrst show that we can
ﬁnd a policy taking a ﬁnite number of values and delivering ‘almost’ the
same welfare as the optimal policy.
Lemma 2 For each  >0 there exists n  such that H(pn ,Tn ,Sn ) −
H(p∗,T∗,S∗) <  .
Proof. Under the optimal policy p∗,T∗,S∗ the value of the objective func-
tion H∗ is ﬁnite, since the total amount that can be extracted from con-
sumers under the individual rationality constraint is ﬁnite, so that for each
δ>0i ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd a large enough t∗ such that:
Z T∗(s)
t∗ e−rt|π (p∗ (t),s)| dt < δ for each s ∈ [s, ¯ s]
Z T∗(s)
t∗
e−rt(p∗(t) − pI)Q(p∗(t),t)dt < δ
Deﬁne the transformed exit schedule ˆ T(s)=m i n{T∗(s),t ∗}.F o ra n yg i v e n
integer N, deﬁne ti as ti = i
Nt∗,i . e . ti is obtained as an end point of the






p(ti)i ft ∈ [ti−1,t i)
pI if t ≥ t∗
26Next deﬁne the exit schedule ˆ Tk as follows. Let s(1),s(2),...,s(n)b ep o i n t s
of discontinuity of ˆ T with jumps greater or equal than δ.S i n c eˆ T is bounded,
the number of these jumps is ﬁnite. Then partition each one of the intervals
[s(i),s(i +1 ) ]i n t ok intervals of equal size. Let us call {s,s 1,...,s z, ¯ s} the






ˆ T(si)i f s ∈ (si−1,s i]a n d i>1
ˆ T(s1)i f s ∈ [s,s 1]







that is, ˆ Qk(pN(t),t) is the total quantity produced at time t by domestic
ﬁrms when the exit schedule ˆ Tk and price schedule pN are adopted. The
numbers k and N can be chosen so that:
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Z tδ
0








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ δ
Z ˆ Tk(si)
T∗(s)




¯ ¯ ¯π(p(t),s i+1) − π(pN(t),s i)




¯ ¯ ¯π(p(t),s i) − π(pN(t),s i)
¯ ¯ ¯ dt < rδ for each i









e−rtπ(pN(t),s i)dt + b S(si+1)
27and b S(s)=b S(si)f o rs ∈ (si−1,s i]. Notice that b S is constructed to make
sure that incentive compatibility is satisﬁed.
We now show that the subsidy is such that b S(s) <S (s)+1 2 δ and
the proﬁt obtained by a ﬁrm of type s is at least Π(s). To show that
b S(s) <S (s)+12δ for each s,l e te S(s)=b S(s)−7δ. We will show that |e S(s)−
S(s)| < 5δ, so that the conclusion immediately follows. To do this, we start






¯ ¯ ¯e S(s) − S(s)
¯ ¯ ¯ =















Z b Tk(¯ s)
0
e−rt|π(p(t),s) − π(pN(t),s)|dt < 2δ
where the last inequality follows from construction of ˆ Tk and pN.







e−rtπ(pN(t),s j)dt + e S(s) (11)
Consider now the original transfer and exit schedules, S and T.I n c e n t i v e
compatibility requires that for each i:
Z T(si+1)
T(si)




where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that type si+1 has no incentive













28Using (11) and the left inequality in (12) we obtain:













e−rtπ(pN(t),s j)dt + e S(s)


We will show that the RHS of this expression is less than 4δ.

























¯ ¯ ¯π(p(t),s j+1) − π(pN(t),s j)








e−rt|π(p(t),s j+1)|dt+|S(s)−e S(s)| < 4δ
where the inequality follows from the construction of b Tk and pN.A na n a l -
ogous argument using (11) and the right inequality in (12) yields S(si) −
e S(si) > −4δ, so that we conclude:
¯ ¯ ¯S(si) − e S(si)
¯ ¯ ¯ < 4δ
A tl a s t ,w eh a v et op r o v e
¯ ¯ ¯S(s) − e S(s)
¯ ¯ ¯ < 5δ for values of s which are not








so that we conclude |S(si) − S(s)| <δ .U s i n ge S(s)=e S(si)w eh a v e :
¯ ¯ ¯e S(s) − S(s)
¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯e S(si) − S(s)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
¯ ¯ ¯e S(si) − S(si)
¯ ¯ ¯ + |S(si) − S(s)| < 5δ
29Last, we have to show that a ﬁrm of type s obtains at least Π(s). The








dt + e S(s)+7 δ
Using deﬁnitions:











e−rt(π(p(t),s))dt + e S(s) − S(s)+7 δ ≥− δ − δ − 5δ +7 δ =0
so that the conclusion follows.














S(s)dF(s)+ 1 2 δ +
Z +∞
0
e−rt(p∗(t) − pI)Q(p∗(t),t)dt +2 δ = H∗ +1 4 δ
By choosing δ =  
14 we obtain HN ≤ H∗ +  .
The next move is to prove that discrete policies have two steps. We ﬁrst
prove the following result.
Lemma 3 The function π(p,s) is supermodular.
Proof. It is enough to show that ∂2π
∂p∂s ≥ 0. B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
∂π
∂p = q(p,s), and by assumption (2), part (2), we have
∂q
∂s ≥ 0.
At last we prove the following:
Lemma 4 Let (pN,TN,SN) be the optimal control when at most N distinct
values are allowed. Then for each N there is a solution such that at most
two values are taken.
30Proof. Let s = s0,s 1,...,s N =¯ s be a partition of the interval [s, ¯ s], and
for each i =1 ,...,N let Ti b et h et i m eo fe x i tf o rﬁrm of type s ∈ [si−1,s i),
and set T0 = 0. Since the mechanism makes no distinction between diﬀerent
ﬁrms except for the time at which they leave, the transfers will be given
by a vector S1,...,S N,w i t hSi being the subsidy paid to a ﬁrm announcing
s ∈ [si−1,s i). For each i =1 ,...,N,l e tpi denote the price speciﬁed by
the mechanism between periods Ti−1 and Ti. We will consider the optimal
choice of {Ti,s i,p i,S i}
N
i= , together with a tax τ,f o rag i v e nN, under the
individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for ﬁrms and





Note that βi is the present value of a unit ﬂow between periods Ti−1 and Ti
and
PN
i=1 βi ≤ 1
r (with equality if TN =+ ∞). The IR constraint for a ﬁrm






i =1 ,...,N (13)
The IC constraint implies that a ﬁrm of type si is indiﬀerent between leaving
at Ti or at Ti+1.T h e r e f o r e :
Si = βi+1π (pi+1,s i)+Si+1.i =1 ,...,N− 1 (14)




βjπ(pj,s j−1)+SN i =1 ,...,N− 1 (15)
We will solve the problem imposing only incentive compatibility and the
condition that a ﬁrm of type s obtains at least
π(po,¯ s)
r .W e w i l l n e x t s h o w





si−1 q(pi,s)dF(s) denote the total output ﬂow pro-
duced each period t ∈ [Ti−1,T i)b yﬁrms in the industry. The total cost to




(F(si) − F(si−1))Si +
N X
i=1
βi (pi − pI)Q(si−1,p i) (16)
After rearrangement, and using F (¯ s)=1 ,w eo b t a i n :
N X
i=1




so that total cost can be written as:
C = SN +
N−1 X
i=0
βi+1 (π(pi+1,s i)F(si)+( pi+1 − pI)Q(pi+1,s i))




















Rearranging terms and using (17) we obtain:






π(pi+1,s)f(s)ds + π(pi+1,s i)F(si)
¶
The relaxed maximization program in which the IR constraint is only im-






v − pI − τ
r
¶







τ (G(¯ v) − G(pI + τ)) ≥ C
N X
j=1







N) be a solution to this problem and deﬁne Tax∗ =
τ∗ (G(¯ v) − G(pI + τ∗))(tax revenue under the optimal policy). It must be


































Tax∗ ≥ SN +
N X
i=1
βi (π(pi,s i−1)F(si−1)+( pi − pI)Q(pi,s i−1)) (20)
N X
j=1







βi ≥ 0 i =1 ,...,N s i ≥ si−1 i =1 ,...,N
where s0 = s and sN =¯ s.
The Lagrangian of the problem is:
































+µ1β1 + ...+ µNβN + θ1 (s1 − s)+...+ θN (¯ s − sN−1)
where (γ,λ,ξ,µ1 ...,µ N,θ 1 ...,θ N) are positive Lagrange multipliers. At
the solution the ﬁrst order conditions must be satisﬁed. The ﬁrst order
condition for SN implies:
1 − λ + ξ =0o rλ =1+ξ ≥ 1












































Equation (22) implies pi ≤ p0 for each i =1 ,...,N. It follows from assump-
tion 2, part 3 that the left hand side is always smaller that the right hand
side when p ≥ p0 (remember that
ξ
λ < 1). The right hand side is always
positive, since the supply function is strictly increasing in s for any given p.
We also notice that a solution to equation (22) exists, since at pi =0t h e
right hand side is negative.
Having established that at the solution pi ≤ p0 we can show that the
individual rationality constraint is satisﬁed for each ﬁrm. First, we know











If there is a s ∈ [si−1,s i) for which the individual rationality constraint
is not satisﬁed, we have:













Combining (23) and (24) we obtain:
i X
j=1
βj (π (pj, ¯ s) − π(pj,s)) +
N X
j=i+1












This is impossible, since supermodularity of π implies:








whenever pj ≤ p0.F u r t h e r m o r e
PN
j=1 βj ≤ 1
r, thus implying that (25)
cannot hold.
To prove now that there is a solution in which at most two βi’s are










be part of a solution to problem
(19). It is obvious that at the optimal solution the budget constraint must



























































βi ≥ 0 i =1 ,...,N
35This is a standard linear programming problem, and we can now directly
apply the fundamental theorem of linear programming (see Luenberger [11])
which tells us that if a solution exists then there is also a solution in which
the number of variables taking non zero values is at most equal to the number
of constraints, in this case two.
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